Background COVID-19 has greatly impacted the health of incarcerated individuals in the US. The goal of this study was to examine perspectives of recently incarcerated individuals on greater restrictions on liberty to mitigate COVID-19 transmission.Methods We conducted semi-structured phone interviews from August through October 2021 with 21 people who had been incarcerated in Bureau of Prisons (BOP) facilities during the pandemic. Transcripts were coded and analyzed, using a thematic analysis approach.Results Many facilities implemented universal “lockdowns,” with time out of the (...) cell often limited to one hour per day, with participants reporting not being able to meet all essential needs such as showers and calling loved ones. Several study participants reported that repurposed spaces and tents created for quarantine and isolation provided “unlivable conditions.” Participants reported receiving no medical attention while in isolation, and staff using spaces designated for disciplinary purposes (e.g., solitary housing units) for public health isolation purposes. This resulted in the conflation of isolation and discipline, which discouraged symptom reporting. Some participants felt guilty over potentially causing another lockdown by not reporting their symptoms. Programming was frequently stopped or curtailed and communication with the outside was limited. Some participants relayed that staff threatened to punish noncompliance with masking and testing. Liberty restrictions were purportedly rationalized by staff with the idea that incarcerated people should not expect freedoms, while those incarcerated blamed staff for bringing COVID-19 into the facility.Conclusions Our results highlighted how actions by staff and administrators decreased the legitimacy of the facilities’ COVID-19 response and were sometimes counterproductive. Legitimacy is key in building trust and obtaining cooperation with otherwise unpleasant but necessary restrictive measures. To prepare for future outbreaks facilities must consider the impact of liberty-restricting decisions on residents and build legitimacy for these decisions by communicating justifications to the extent possible. (shrink)

Each decade since 1979, the Healthy People initiative establishes the national prevention agenda and provides the foundation for disease prevention and health promotion policies and programs. Law and policy have been included in Healthy People objectives from the start, but not integrated into the overall initiative as well as possible to potentially leverage change to meet Healthy People targets and goals. This article provides background on the Healthy People initiative and its use among various stakeholder groups, describes the work of (...) a project aiming to better integrate law and policy into this initiative, and discusses the development of Healthy People 2030 — the next iteration of health goals for the nation. Lessons from the preliminary stages of developing Healthy People by the HHS Secretary's Advisory Committee on National Health Promotion and Disease Prevention Objectives for 2030 and a Federal Interagency Workgroup will be included. Efforts by the Committee focused on the role of law and policy as determinants of health and valuable resources around health equity are also shared. Finally, the article discusses ways that law and policy can potentially be tools to help meet Healthy People targets and to attain national health goals. (shrink)

Cette édition numérique a été réalisée à partir d'un support physique, parfois ancien, conservé au sein du dépôt légal de la Bibliothèque nationale de France, conformément à la loi n° 2012-287 du 1er mars 2012 relative à l'exploitation des Livres indisponibles du XXe siècle. La politesse n'est-elle qu'un ensemble d'usages contingents ou bien a-t-elle une signification propre? En quoi se distingue-t-elle des autres formes de sociabilité, a-t-elle une signification directe? Cette étude reprise dans une perspective philosophique révèle la nature paradoxale (...) de la politesse, à la fois langage créateur de sens et langage formel. « Copyright Electre » Pages de début Avant-propos Introduction - Délimitation et analyse du champ de recherche Chapitre I - Mesures d'ordre préalables Chapitre II - Les antécédents de la politesse Chapitre III - Les principales figures de la politesse Conclusion - L'unité du domaine de référence et, par suite, la nature de la politesse font problème Première partie - Le conflit des interprétations Quatre sortes de motifs Chapitre I - L'interprétation psychologique Chapitre II - La référence sociale Chapitre III - Une motivation ambiguë : la recherche de la distinction Chapitre IV - La problématique morale et religieuse Bilan - L'échec de la réflexion traditionnelle sur les fondements de la politesse Deuxième partie - Théorie de la politesse Introduction. Originalité, possibilité et vraisemblance du formalisme Chapitre I - Une messe en latin Chapitre II - Le modus operandi des pratiques de politesse Chapitre III - Fonction principale et sens fondamental des conduites de politesse Conclusion - Un art spécifique de la communication Chapitre IV - La politesse est une création culturelle Présentation Chapitre I - Le divers et son unité Chapitre II - Les degrés du formalisme : maximum, minimum et optimum Chapitre III - Ultimes questions sur la systématicité de la politesse Troisième partie - L'avenir de la politesse Chapitre I - Les constantes de la politesse Chapitre II - L'avenir incertain de la politesse Index des auteurs Pages defin. (shrink)

Comment l’identité narrative de Jésus se décline-t-elle dans l’évangile selon Matthieu? La question est traitée en quatre étapes, à commencer par un examen de l’impact christologique des limites du récit matthéen (commencement et finale). Dans un deuxième temps, l’attention se porte sur le développement de l’intrigue de résolution et, en troisième lieu, sur l’intrigue de révélation. En finale, une réflexion est proposée sur la christologie de Mt à la croisée des chemins. L’hypothèse est que la rédaction de Mt s’inscrit sous (...) le signe d’une double marginalité: celle d’une communauté chrétienne vivant à l’intérieur du monde juif dont elle fait toujours partie, mais avec laquelle les tensions vont croissant; celle aussi d’une communauté judéo-chrétienne qui peine à se positionner au sein d’un christianisme de plus en plus tourné vers les païens. Du coup, le Jésus présenté par Mt est moins énigmatique que celui de Mc; il est plus clairement défini et son autorité est plus affirmée.// What are the varieties of the narrative identity of Jesus in the Gospel of Matthew? The question is treated in four stages, starting with the Christological impact of the limits of the Matthean narrative (beginning and finale). In a second section, attention is given to the development of the plot of resolution, thirdly to the plot of revelation. Finally a reflection is proposed on the Christology of Mt at the crossroads. The hypothesis given is that the redaction of Mt took place under the sign of a double marginality: that of a Christian community living within the Jewish world of which it was still part but with which there were increasing tensions, also that of a Jewish-Christian community which had more and more difficulties of situating itself within a Christianity which was more and more orientated towards the pagans. As a result, the Jesus presented by Mt is less enigmatic than that of Mk, he is more clearly defined and his authority is more strongly asserted. (shrink)

My objective here is to give an account of self-deprecating humor—examining what works, what doesn't, and why—and to reflect on the significance of the audience response. More specifically, I will be focusing not only on the purpose or intention behind self-deprecating jokes, but considering how their consequences might render them successful or unsuccessful. For example, under what circumstances does self-deprecation tend to put listeners at ease, and when is this type of humor more likely to put people off? I will (...) also consider the ways in which self-deprecating jokes are similar to gallows humor, and the extent to which context counts. The target or "butt" of these jokes, in cases of self-deprecation as well as gallows humor, will be explored; as will whether or not the audience bears some responsibility or has a role to play in the ultimate success or failure of a joke. For instance, is the audience role a completely receptive and passive one? Is the joker/jokee relationship one which confers no responsibility on the listener whatsoever? Or, do listeners have an obligation to respond with appreciative laughter to mere attempts at humor, especially the self-deprecating sort, by accepting such levity in the spirit in which it is intended? Does this mean that being a good sport—responding generously or appreciatively when a well-intentioned joke fails to land—would be a habit worth cultivating? If so and courtesy laughter or a playful appreciation of self-deprecating humor is something that can be cultivated, what specifically would that entail? In sum, although I cannot fully or definitively answer each and every one of these questions, I do hope to provide some provisional responses. To better situate the nature of self-deprecation, I will not only provide a brief description of the gallows genre, I will also explore two traditional theories of humor. Those that are particularly relevant, to both gallows and self-deprecating humor are Freud's relief theory and the incongruity view. In addition, I will identify what I believe to be the three essential ingredients of successful self-deprecation and, finally, will conclude with the argument that audiences or listeners do have an important role to play. And, moreover, that generous, appreciative laughter can and should be cultivated—even though this is something that will largely depend on one's personal history and habits, dispositional character and cultural background. (shrink)

Boris Vian crée son hétéronyme Vernon Sullivan en 1946. Or, leurs romans s’inscrivent dans des sous-genres discursifs bien distincts. Dès lors, peut-on parler de deux romanciers pour une même plume? Quel rôle joue le genre et son impact endigue-t-il tout point de rencontre? Au contraire, existe-t-il, malgré tout, des liens intertextuels entre les deux œuvres? Ces questions résultent d’une rencontre entre trois recherches doctorales qui a permis de croiser un concept (l’hétéronymie) à une méthode (la logométrie). Pour répondre à ces (...) questions linguistiques, cet article déroule en effet le protocole méthodologique de la logométrie et propose des premiers éléments de réponse. Pour réaliser cette étude, notre corpus contraste les romans de douze auteurs contemporains et proches génériquement des romans de Boris Vian et de Vernon Sullivan. Ce corpus est disponible sur le logiciel Hyperbase (développé au laboratoire Bases, Corpus, Langage UMR 7320). Le parcours interprétatif de cet article est le suivant : nous partons de résultats issus de la statistique occurrentielle (1) et cooccurrentielle (2) pour aller progressivement vers des zones de textualité réunissant Boris Vian à Vernon Sullivan (3). (shrink)

Tantôt nous retenons que Dieu s’est donné au temps de sa venue, mais nous pensons que le don, le message et la vie du Christ sont épuisés. […] Tantôt, en sens inverse, nous oublions que Dieu s’est donné en personne, absolument, pour croire que tout est à inventer, que l’Église n’a pas d’héritage. Sartre nous offre, semble-t-il, les moyens de bien poser le problème de notre incrédulité nouvelle, pour peu qu’on n’appauvrisse pas le sens qu’il a donné à la notion (...) de « mauvaise foi ». Gardons-nou... (shrink)

In the Essays on the Active Powers of Man V. 7, Thomas Reid seeks to show “[t]hat moral approbation implies a real judgment,” contrasting this thesis with the view that moral approbation is no more than a feeling. Unfortunately, his criticism of moral sentimentalism systematically conflates two different metaethical views: non-cognitivism about moral thought and subjectivism about moral properties. However, if we properly disentangle the various parts of Reid's discussion, we can isolate pertinent arguments against each of these views. Some (...) of these arguments, such as the argument from disagreement and the argument from implausible counterfactuals against subjectivism, or the transparency argument against non-cognitivism, still have important roles to play in contemporary metaethics. (shrink)

It is trivially true that comedians make jokes and thus are not serious; they are “just playing.” But watching Louis CK, especially his performances in Chewed Up, Shameless, and Hilarious, it is evident that he has more in mind than simply getting his audience to frivolously guffaw. I will make the case that this is so given the content of some of his humor which centers on areas of socio-political-ethical tensions that can be uncomfortable when addressed in a direct, “bona-fide” (...) communicative mode. I will concentrate upon his playful, yet serious, account of issues surrounding race and privilege which, though not obvious center-pieces, can be found in almost all of his performances. These are complex areas that are not obvious fodder for humor, and it is clear that his comedic repertoire is broad enough that he is not including these issues for lack of funnier bits. I will argue that through his humor, he at once brings to consciousness hidden biases, challenges them in a subversive manner on behalf of those harmed by cultural stereotypes, e.g., and opens up an otherwise adversarial audience to the possibility that they harbor such unwanted stereotypes—a necessary element in consciousness-raising. My account will require a brief distinction between seriousness and playfulness, a defense of the claim that we are drawn to humor even when it is used to question our cherished presuppositions, and an interpretation of thought experiments that parallels Louis CK’s comedic mechanisms in his stand-up performances and episodes from Louie. In some cases he is explicit that he is just “making shit up” (Oh My God), or, as he cautions in the setup to a story in Shameless, “it doesn’t matter cus’ I’m gonna lie to you.” But that does not take away from my point that he is serious with his humor about social reality in the same way that philosophers have traditionally “made shit up” with thought experiments for serious purposes. Louis CK employs a similar device with his humor, and in many ways is more effective than philosophers in making the implicit explicit for his (much larger) audiences who then spread his word. (shrink)

Ist das Spurenlesen archaischer Restbestand eines \textgreaterwilden Wissens\textless oder läßt es sich in allen entfalteten Zeichen-, Erkenntnis- und Interpretationstechniken aufspüren? Wie kann das Spurenlesen vom Textlesen und vom Interpretieren sprachlicher und bildlicher Zeichen abgegrenzt werden? Bilden Spuren die Nahtstelle der Entstehung von Sinn aus Nichtsinn? Verbinden sie unsere Zeichenpraktiken mit der Dinghaftigkeit, Körperlichkeit und Materialität der Welt? Werden Spuren entdeckt oder werden sie im Akt des Spurenlesens überhaupt erst hervorgebracht? Das sind Fragen, auf die der Band Antworten sucht. Seine Leitidee (...) ist, daß das Spurenlesen eine Orientierungstechnik und eine Wissenskunst verkörpert, die nicht nur in der Philosophie und den Geisteswissenschaften, sondern auch in den Naturwissenschaften wirksam wird. (shrink)

“ A man orders a whole pizza pie for himself and is asked whether he would like it cut into eight or four slices. He responds, ‘Four, I’m on a diet ”’ (Noël Carroll) -/- While not hilarious --so funny that it induces chortling punctuated with outrageous vomiting--this little gem is amusing. We recognize that something has gone wrong. On a first reading it might not compute, something doesn’t quite make sense. Then, aha! , we understand the hapless dieter has (...) misapplied general rules of thumb, mental short-cuts, or heuristics, that we were also initially committed to and that would usually be good enough to rely upon— fewer slices equals fewer calories; diets require fewer calories, etc—but in this particular case they fail, and the feeling of mirth is our reward for making this discovery. We don’t say all of that after a punchline, of course, but that’s what is happening according to the Humor as Error-Detection Theory : our sense of humor can sense our errors. This chapter will focus on the overlap and benefits of a humorous and philosophical attitude toward the world and our place in it. The historian of philosophy Will Durant tells us that genuine philosophy begins when one learns to doubt; we can say something similar with humor--trust me. (shrink)

"The Mind is not a Vessel to be Filled but a Fire to be Kindled", and "Education is Not the Filling of Pail But the Lighting of a Fire", and ... Something About a Horse ... You can lead a horse to water, but you can’t make it smile? Because of the long face and all? (No, that can’t be it). Anyway, borrowing a bit from Plutarch and Yeats (maybe, there is no agreement on whether he said that about pails (...) and fires), and some idiom from 12th Century Old English about horses walking on water, I assume, we can glean the following gem: learning requires active participation by learners. It is almost embarrassing to have to write that, but here we are with education today, mostly unloading facts into unlit receptacles. This doesn’t work, and not just because the metaphor is mixed. Genuine learning requires focus, which requires motivation, which is cultivated by interest, which needs curiosity, which is not something teachable through the typical educational curricula. I can, as Aristotle tells us, teach students the basics of some ethical theory, but I cannot make them virtuous. Ah-ha! I can lead a horse to water, but I can’t make it abide by the categorical imperative (No, that’s not quite right. Although it’s true--most horses are utilitarians). One way that seems to work in piquing student interest in learning philosophy is to use humor as you make the case that a philosophical attitude is very similar to a humorous attitude. Both rely heavily on questioning our collective presuppositions, both cultivate rational skepticism, and both are never content with accepting traditions and values that are mindlessly received. I’ve got it now: You can lead a horse to water, but you can’t make it an iconoclast! (still not it). Friedrich Nietzsche published a book in 1889 titled Twilight of the Idols: Or How to Philosophize with a Hammer. This was during his most frenetic and fecund period, just before the syphilis set in rendering him somewhat less than his lauded Ubermensch. The “Idols” for Nietzsche were “false gods” or the ubiquitous errors that philosophy should expose. He is likely borrowing (without citation!) from sir Francis Bacon, whose “idols” are fetishes which can divert us from the pursuit of truth. Learning is hard, but it doesn’t have to be gloomy, hence, I advocate for a different sort of hammer to act as a “tuning-fork” sounding out the hollow and dangerous idols handed down to us that have passed for sagacity. (shrink)

Von Hippel & Trivers (VH&T) interpret belief in God and belief in strong government as the outcome of an active process of self-deception on a worldwide scale. We propose, instead, that these beliefs might simply be a passive spin-off of efficient cognitive processes.

According to Manuel Davenport, “The best humorists--Mark Twain, Will Rogers, Bob Hope, and Mort Sahl--share [a] mixture of detachment and desire, eagerness to believe, and irreverence concerning the possibility of certainty. And when they become serious about their convictions--as Twain did about colonialism…they cease to be humorous” (p. 171). I agree with the first part, but not the second. Humor does require disengagement, but not completely such that one has no emotional interest in the subject of the humor. Humor does (...) require some degree of commitment to value, but, as Davenport rightly notes, it “despairs of absolutes.” Following Bertrand Russell, “humorous” and “serious” are not antonyms. Davenport does not provide examples of Twain’s attempts at satire that fail to be humorous due to being serious. I will examine some of the very serious issues Twain addresses through irony and humor, and make the case that his commentary and argument, though serious, is still funny while not falling into frivolity. There is a philosophical thread running through his scathing humor, and it largely centers around his raising awareness about, and then deflating, what I would call a “spirit of seriousness”, borrowing from Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone De Beauvoir. For De Beauvoir, expanding on Sartre’s conception, a spirit of seriousness manifests from serious people who attempt to find comfort in the firm, unchanging foundations and values that are seen to be pre-determined, and thus unquestionable. In Twain’s case, it is arrogance and a presumed sense of certitude. This destructive combination sustains many of the institutions (some of them quite “peculiar”) that he attacks: racism, slavery, colonialism, excesses of capitalism, and the often dogmatic and oppressive nature of organized religion: “What gets us into trouble is not what we don’t know; it’s what we know for sure that just ain’t so.” Complacency, self-satisfaction, disinclination to self-monitoring, all lead to closed mode, or rather, to sustaining a serious mode which can spillover into a “spirit of seriousness” if not checked. The quickest path to a feeling of being certain is cultivated ignorance, where doubt and confusion, ambiguity and fluidity are glossed over. This feeling or attitude, the “spirit of seriousness”, is what Twain confronts with serious humor, motivating his readers to consider where their ideals and reality contradict. (shrink)

“Just as philosophy begins with doubt, so also a life that may be called human begins with irony” (Kierkegaard The Concept of Irony with Continual Reference to Socrates, pg.6, thesis XV) What has proportion to do with humor or irony? And what do either of these have to do with being human? Jokes, laughter, and funniness connote excess, exaggeration, incongruity, dissonance, etc., the opposite of proportion--balance, symmetry, Aristotle’s golden mean. Yet, The Philosopher maintains, the wit has found the ideal moderate (...) position between the deficient boor who seems constitutionally incapable of laughing, and the excessive buffoon who doesn’t know how to laugh at the right time, in the right way, or for the right reasons--buffoonish laughter is indiscriminate. The title, paraphrasing Hume, is consistent with Kierkegaard’s valorization of irony, as philosophical doubt and the confusion induced through Socratic Irony both call for a special sort of proportion: ontological proportion. Put simply, one ought to proportion one’s being, as well as others’, as though along a shifting spectrum rather than essentially and hierarchically. The latter fosters a serious attitude that takes polarities as the rule with no exceptions; black or white, good or evil, with us or against us, one of us or one of them, always seeking the ideal of purity. We see this disproportion in authoritarians who manifestly lack a sense of humor--Hitler’s joke courts, Turkey’s president Erdoğan attempting legal punishment against a comedian who mocked him, and Trump’s thin-skinned inability to laugh at his own expense, a monumental character flaw for the most powerful person in the world. Their views are serious, rigid, closed, and dogmatic about themselves, others, and for each of them excepting Trump, the presumed absolute nature of values--Trump’s unironic pretense toward any value is merely a means to service his own absolute end, himself. The playfully ironic person can cope with reality, with ambiguity and, borrowing from Maria Lugones, “ontological confusion,” the not-fully-settled identity. (shrink)

Camill Leberer (geb. 1953) gehört zu den profiliertesten deutschen Bildhauern seiner Generation. Das vorliegende Buch untersucht seine durch die Verwendung von Stahl und Glas ausgezeichneten Plastiken erstmals unter dem Aspekt der Immaterialität. Dazu werden Bezüge zur amerikanischen Light and Space Bewegung, zu amerikanischen wie deutschen Stahlkünstlern und zur Gruppe Zero erarbeitet. Unter anderem durch diese wird das ästhetische Prinzip Immaterialität im Werk Leberers anhand der Informationsästhetik Max Benses kunsthistorisch eingeordnet.

Confusion abounds in Jonathan Kramer’s attempt, in “Can Modernism Survive George Rochberg?” , to reply to the issues I raised in my essay “Can the Arts Survive Modernism? ” . Besides the endemic disarray of his thought process, he confutes and contradicts himself at every turn—either out of his own mouth or out of the mouths of those he quotes to support his position. He is incapable of following his own line of argument either because he doesn’t remember in (...) one part of his paper what he’s said in another or because he doesn’t grasp the logical implications of his own statements sufficiently follow through. Thus he constantly cuts the ground out from under his own feet.Some specific illustrations are in order. First, let me deal with how he “thinks.” To write prose we perforce must use words; and when we use words, it behooves us to know what they mean. All too often Kramer appears not to know what key words he uses do mean—but he marches blindly on through his own jungle of tangled thoughts. For instance, when he says, “A far better example of reductionism in musical scholarship than Schenker’s multilayered theory is Rochberg’s own article,” he reveals a total lack of understanding his key word, “reductionism” . “Reductionism” is the distilled or diminished content left after removing, stripping away, all alternative ways of understanding a situation or problem. That, of course, is what Schenker did in promulgating his theory of tonal practice, and it is clear Kramer understands that much. “Reductionism,” however, hardly describes the presentation of an overview of the impact of modernism on the life of the twentieth century which is what my article does. George Rochberg is the composer of a large body of musical works and the author of a recently published collection of essays, The Aesthetics of Survival, a Composer’s View of Twentieth-Century Music. He recently completed his fifth symphony, on commission from the Chicago Symphony. In 1983 he retired from the University of Pennsylvania as Emeritus Annenberg Professor of the Humanities. His previous contribution to Critical Inquiry, “Can the Arts Survive Modernism? ,” appeared in the December 1984 issue. (shrink)

I do not answer my title’s question in this paper. Instead, my aims are first to show that the question is worth asking, secondly to show that its answer will not be trivial, and thirdly to show that it is unclear what the answer is. From these three conclusions it follows that many contemporary Hohfeldian approaches to the conceptual analysis of rights (including those of Sumner, Jones, Kramer, Wenar and myself)1, while potentially capable of extensional accuracy, overlook an essential (...) but unidentified feature of rights: the feature which explains why duties are not rights. The paper challenges theorists to investigate what this feature is. (shrink)

In his 2010 paper ‘Grounding and Truth-Functions’, Fabrice Correia has developed the first and so far only proposal for a logic of ground based on a worldly conception of facts. In this paper, we show that the logic allows the derivation of implausible grounding claims. We then generalize these results and draw some conclusions concerning the structural features of ground and its associated notion of relevance, which has so far not received the attention it deserves.

Vom urmări o rețea de texte de toate felurile... care ilustrează cultura autenticității răspândită în rândul 'tinerelor generații' din Europa, în primele decenii ale secolului trecut. Locul lor geometric e obsesia redefinirii sinelui, iar discursurile autorilor români (printre care Eliade, Cioran, Holban, Eugen Ionescu, Nae Ionescu, Camil Petrescu, Sebastian, Vulcănescu) nu fac excepție. Atunci când vorbesc despre autenticitate, ei au în vedere identitatea, din perspectivă narativă, psihologică, etnică sau politică, la fel ca scriitoriii occidentali de la care au importat setul (...) de ideologeme"--Ștefan Firică, back cover flap. (shrink)

On its intended interpretation, logical, mathematical and metaphysical discourse sometimes seems to involve absolutely unrestricted quantification. Yet our standard semantic theories do not allow for interpretations of a language as expressing absolute generality. A prominent strategy for defending absolute generality, influentially proposed by Timothy Williamson in his paper ‘Everything’, avails itself of a hierarchy of quantifiers of ever increasing orders to develop non-standard semantic theories that do provide for such interpretations. However, as emphasized by Øystein Linnebo and Agustín Rayo, there (...) is pressure on this view to extend the quantificational hierarchy beyond the finite level, and, relatedly, to allow for a cumulative conception of the hierarchy. In his recent book, Modal Logic as Metaphysics, Williamson yields to that pressure. I show that the emerging cumulative higher-orderist theory has implications of a strongly generality-relativist flavour, and consequently undermines much of the spirit of generality absolutism that Williamson set out to defend. (shrink)

Some important recent articles, including one in this journal, have sought to devise theories of rights that can transcend the longstanding debate between the Interest Theory and the Will Theory. The present essay argues that those efforts fail and that the Interest Theory and the Will Theory withstand the criticisms that have been levelled against them. To be sure, the criticisms have been valuable in that they have prompted the amplification and clarification of the two dominant theories of rights; but (...) their upshot has been to reveal the need for the improvement, rather than the abandonment, of those theories. (shrink)

A lot of research has recently been done on the topic of ground, and in particular on the logic of ground. According to a broad consensus in that debate, ground is hyperintensional in the sense that even logically equivalent truths may differ with respect to what grounds them, and what they ground. This renders pressing the question of what we may take to be the ground-theoretic content of a true statement, i.e. that aspect of the statement’s overall content to which (...) ground is sensitive. I propose a novel answer to this question, namely that ground tracks how, rather than just by what, a statement is made true. I develop that answer in the form of a formal theory of ground-theoretic content and show how the resulting framework may be used to articulate plausible theories of ground, including in particular a popular account of the grounds of truth-functionally complex truths that has proved difficult to accommodate on alternative views of content. (shrink)

Alternative currencies are means of payment that circulate alongside—as an alternative or complement to—official currencies. While these currencies have existed for a long time, both society and academia have shown a renewed interest in their potential to decentralize the governance of monetary affairs and to bring people and organizations together in more ethical or sustainable ways. This article is a review of the ethical and philosophical implications of these alternative monetary projects. We first discuss various classifications of these currencies before (...) analyzing the ethical challenges linked to the way they tackle social and environmental issues. We also examine the incentive-based and coercive mechanisms used by these currencies from an ethical perspective and debate the promises and perils of monetary decentralization and democracy. We conclude by identifying an agenda for future research. (shrink)

Dini mûsikî ilmî çalışma sahasında yapılacak olan çalışmalar arasında en acil ve önemli olanı derleme çalışmalarıdır. Böyle çalışmaların icrası, büyük ve köklü medeniyetimizin son temsicileri ile günümüz insanı ilgilileri arasında kurulacak bir bağ ile mümkün olabilir. Bu bağı kurmak günümüz insanının aslî vazifelerindendir. Eğer bizler bu muazzam medeniyetin mûsikî mirasını son temsilcilerinden derleyip kayıt altına almazsak bu kültür mirası yok olacaktır. Bu bağlamda mûsikî mirasımızı hâvi kaynak kişiler çok büyük önem arz etmektedirler. Bu kuşak kaybolduğu zaman artık zaten ilahilerden ve (...) geçmişin mûsikî kültüründen söz edemeyiz. Camiler, köprüler gibi taşınamayan kültürel varlıklar ve kitaplar gibi yazılı kaynaklar on yıllar sonra da restrore edilip ihya edilebilir fakat kaynak kişilerin hafızasında saklı sözlü gelenek ve mûsikî kültürü böyle bir zamanda kaybolmaya mahkumdur. Aslında bu olay zamana karşı nasıl bir yarış içerisinde olduğumuzu da göstermektedir. Bu noktada insan ömrü meselenin aciliyetini ve ehemmiyetini belirleyen en önemli kriter olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Sonuç olarak sözlü geleneğin ve mûsikî kültürünün derlenmesi zaman, tahrif edilme ve hatta yok olma tehlikesinden ötürü bahsedilen diğer kültürel varlıklardan ehem ve mühim sıralamasında daha önde gelmektedir. Kültürel varlıkların muhafazası hususunda sırayı bu şartlar belirler. Bu çalışma sözlü gelenek ve mûsikî kültürü, husûsen dinî mûsikî derleme çalışmalarının nasıl yapılacağını, derleme çalışmaları sırasında riayet edilecek kuralları ve uygulanacak metodları ele almaktadır. (shrink)

Belief revision theories standardly endorse a principle of intensionality to the effect that ideal doxastic agents do not discriminate between pieces of information that are equivalent within classical logic. I argue that this principle should be rejected. Its failure, on my view, does not require failures of logical omniscience on the part of the agent, but results from a view of the update as _mighty_: as encoding what the agent learns might be the case, as well as what must be. (...) The view is motivated by consideration of a puzzle case, obtained by transposing into the context of belief revision a kind of scenario that Kit Fine has used to argue against intensionalism about counterfactuals. Employing the framework of truthmaker semantics, I go on to develop a novel account of belief revision, based on a conception of the update as mighty, which validates natural hyperintensional counterparts of the usual AGM postulates. (shrink)

Every problem of dirty hands is a moral conflict in which a highly unpalatable course of conduct is chosen for the sake of fulfilling a stringent moral duty, and in which either the chosen course of conduct is evil or else it would have been evil in the absence of the exigent circumstances to which it is a response. To support this conception of problems of dirty hands, this paper endeavors to elucidate the nature of moral conflicts and the nature (...) of evil. (shrink)

On one important notion of irrelevance, evidence that is irrelevant in an inquiry may rationally be discarded, and attempts to obtain evidence amount to a waste of resources if they are directed at irrelevant evidence. The familiar Bayesian criterion of irrelevance, whatever its merits, is not adequate with respect to this notion. I show that a modification of the criterion due to Ken Gemes, though a significant improvement, still has highly implausible consequences. To make progress, I argue, we need to (...) adopt a hyperintensional conception of content. I go on to formulate a better, hyperintensional criterion of irrelevance, drawing heavily on the framework of the truthmaker conception of propositions as recently developed by Kit Fine. (shrink)